Reimagining Borderless Education between Indonesia and China

In April 2024, I embarked on a ten-day visit to China, covering three cities, two hi-tech companies, several government institutions, six academic institutions, various museums, and, of course, indulging in a lot of delicious food. It was my longest work visit to a single country in over a decade, and the experience left a lasting impression. This visit deepened my ongoing interest in transnational education, an area I’ve been reflecting on for years, particularly in the context of fostering mutual understanding across borders.
China is synonymous with technological advancement. My visits to companies like Envision and Huawei revealed more than just cutting-edge innovation. China is a country with bold visions and an unparalleled commitment to realizing them. The focus is not only on solving today’s problems but also on addressing issues that lie in the future.

Alongside its technological prowess, China takes the preservation of culture and heritage very seriously. The Terracotta Army, for example, is not merely a display of ancient craftsmanship but a testament to the pride China takes in its past. The preservation of these artefacts is about instilling the values of that greatness into younger generations, ensuring they carry forward the spirit of a nation poised to remain significant. This balance between innovation and tradition is something I found particularly fascinating.

This was not my first visit to China. My initial trip to Beijing was back in 1999. Since then, I’ve witnessed the country’s transformation into a modern society. While wealth can easily enable technological progress, societal transformation is a more profound achievement. Clean cities, law-abiding citizens, and an overall sense of order stand as clear indicators of this progress, reflecting a well-integrated approach to modernization.

Academically, I am deeply impressed by China’s educational openness. During our trip, we visited institutions such as Fudan University, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Xi’an Jiao Tong University, and Peking University. One notable feature is China’s growing interest in Indonesia, with dedicated Indonesian study centres where students actively learn Bahasa Indonesia. This represents a forward-thinking approach to strengthening future ties between the two nations.

I also had the opportunity to meet a number of Indonesian students studying in various universities in China. The Indonesian Student Association of China (PPI Tiongkok) is a strong organization, and I exchanged ideas with its activists. The increasing number of Indonesian students studying in China year after year, supported by various scholarships, is promising. Interestingly, tuition fees and living costs are not as expensive as I had imagined, and with scholarships, the financial burden is significantly eased.

One of the most effective ways to enhance this understanding is through educational exchanges. Currently, there is an imbalance: at Universitas Gadjah Mada, for instance, we welcomed over 40 Chinese students in 2023, yet only sent four Indonesian students to China. This disparity needs to be addressed, especially as our nations become more interdependent. The future of Indonesia-China collaboration in education lies in transnational education, where both countries mutually recognize each other’s educational systems. Such collaboration would allow students from both countries to experience each other’s education without barriers, fostering a deeper understanding of our cultures and systems.

Of course, the Indonesia-China relationship is not without its obstacles. The South China Sea tension is one issue that often puts the two countries in a challenging position. During my visit to China, this dispute was a topic I raised. Over the last two decades, I have studied this issue, and this visit allowed me to engage directly with Chinese scholars and hear their candid views. While it is too early to draw conclusions, I see potential for continued dialogue. Understanding each other’s positions is the first step in conflict resolution, and while the South China Sea issue is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, I left with a sense that goodwill and conversations will continue.

A difficult issue like the South China Sea dispute requires mutual understanding, and educational exchanges can play a crucial role. Indonesian students immersing themselves in Chinese day-to-day life will increase their chances of comprehending complex issues from multiple angles. The same applies to Chinese students studying in Indonesia. Through these exchanges, our students will gain not only academic knowledge but also the cultural sensitivity needed to navigate geopolitical tensions.

In the near future, I imagine a female student from Papua beginning her studies in Geodetic Engineering at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) in Yogyakarta, and then moving to Peking University (PU) in Beijing in her second year to continue her education on geospatial-related field. This would be seamless, as PU and UGM would mutually recognize each other’s curriculum. While studying at PU, she could intern at a high-tech company in Beijing, gaining firsthand experience of technological advancements and Chinese work culture. She could then return to UGM to complete her degree in computer science. With her cross-cultural experiences and education, she would be an invaluable asset to a Chinese-Indonesian company in Sulawesi.

This scenario could just as easily apply to a Chinese student studying in both China and Indonesia. Starting their education in China and continuing it in Indonesia would no longer be an issue with mutual recognition. In the future, I envision that such exchanges will become the norm. With greater exchange of students, professors, and ideas, I am confident that Indonesia and China will not only strengthen their relationship but also play a crucial role in shaping a more harmonious regional future.

I Made Andi Arsana

Menggugat Ekspor Pasir Laut

Tahun 2023 lalu, isu pasir laut sempat menghebohkan. Pasalnya, Presiden Jokowi membuka kembali izin ekspor pasir laut yang selama 20 tahun sebelumnya sempat dilarang. Kebijakan itu dituangkan dalam Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 26 tahun 2023 (PP 26/2023) yang dengan segera mengundang kontroversi. Tahun ini, isu yang sama kembali mengemuka.

Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan Nomor 20 dan 21 tahun 2024 (Permendag 20/2024 dan Permendag 21/2024) menindaklanjuti PP 26/2023 dan menegaskan soal ekspor pasir ini. Kegaduhan terjadi lagi. Berbagai pandangan dan spekulasi bermunculan. Dikeluarkannya kebijakan ini di ujung pemerintahan Presiden Jokowi juga menimbulkan kecurigaan.

Meskipun isu yang beredar adalah perihal ekspor pasir laut, sebenarnya PP 26/2023 mengatur hal yang lebih luas. Nama resmi PPnya adalah Pengelolaan Hasil Sedimentasi di Laut. Tujuan idealnya adalah memastikan dasar laut di kawasan tertentu terbebas dari pendangkalan akibat adanya pengendapan (sedimentasi). Secara teknis, pemantauan sedimentasi ini melibatkan survei batimetri atau pemetaan dasar laut yang melibatkan keahlian geodesi, hidrografi, dan oseanografi. PP 26/2023 juga cukup komprehensif mengatur tahap perencanaan, pengendalian, pemanfaatan, dan pengawasan. Idealnya, pengaturan langkah yang komprehensif ini untuk meminimalisir dampak buruk.

Respon keras terhadap kebijakan pemerintah ini berawal dari pasal 9 PP 26/2023 yang mengatakan bahwa hasil sedimentasi di laut bisa diekspor. Secara lengkap, pemanfaatannya ada empat yaitu a) reklamasi dalam negeri, b) pembangunan infrastruktur pemerintah, c) pembangunan prasarana oleh pelaku usaha; dan/atau d) ekspor. Ditegaskan bahwa pasir bisa diekspor “sepanjang kebutuhan dalam negeri terpenuhi dan sesuai dengan ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan.”

Secara normatif, ekspor pasir laut hanyalah Sebagian kecil dari PP 26/2023 ini. Meski demikian, bagian ini yang mengundang reaksi paling keras. Ada empat perihal yang menjadi penyebabnya yaitu isu lingkungan, batas maritim, aspek bisnis, serta konsistensi legal.

Isu lingkungan menjadi sorotan tajam karena pengerukan sedimentasi di laut jelas akan berpengaruh pada lingkungan pantai. Secara ideal menurut PP 26/2023, pengerukan sedimen ini dimaksudkan untuk menjaga lingkungan dasar laut dan pantai agar tetap kondusif. Meski demikian, jika dilakukan secara berlebihan dan melebihi daya dukung lingkungan justru akan merusak lingkungan. Banyak yang khawatir, pengerukan yang akan dilakukan tidak benar-benar untuk kepentingan pengelolaan sedimentasi berlebih tetapi memang untuk kepentingan eksploitasi. Jika ini terjadi, akan berdampak langsung pada kawasan pesisir karena dapat meningkatkan abrasi.

Isu kedua terkait dengan batas maritim. Diduga kuat bahwa negara tujuan utama ekspor pasir laut ini adalah Singapura seperti yang juga terjadi 20 tahun lalu. Singapura menjadi lebih luas secara signifikan karena proses reklamasi menggunakan pasir yang dibeli dari Indonesia. Perubahan luas daratan Singapura ini menyebabkan perubahan garis pantai dan ini dikhawatirkan akan menggeser batas maritim antara Singapura dan Indonesia ke arah Indonesia.

Kekhawatiran soal batas maritim ini tidak beralasan. Pasalnya, batas maritim antara Singapura dan Indonesia sudah ditetapkan tahun 1973, 2009, dan 2014 dan batas maritim yang sudah ditetapkan itu tidak akan berubah karena adanya perubahan garis pantai salah satu pihak. Hal ini sesuai dengan Pasal 62 ayat 2.A.a Konvensi Wina 1969. Analoginya, seperti kondisi dua rumah yang saling bertetangga. Salah satu rumah yang membesar karena renovasi, tidak akan menggeser posisi pagar pekarangan yang sudah ditetapkan.

Isu ketiga terkait aspek bisnis. Banyak yang menduga bahwa dikeluarkannya kebijakan ini memang ditujukan untuk membuka keran ekspor pasir laut agar pebisnis tertentu bisa meraup keuntungan. Menurut pandangan ini, narasi pengelolaan sedimentasi di laut hanyalah kedok belaka. Tidak sedikit analisis yang menunjukkan adanya berbagai kepentingan bisnis yang terkait erat dengan kebijakan ini. Berbagai analisis juga menunjukkan kedekatan beberapa pengusaha yang diduga akan menjadi pemain utama ekspor pasir ini dengan penguasa. Apakah ini benar? Tentu banyak hal yang harus diteliti dengan sangat serius.

Isu keempat terkait dengan konsistensi legal. Pada tahun 2003, Menteri Perindustrian dan Perdagangan RI mengeluarkan Keputusan Menteri nomor 117/MPP/Kep/2/2003 tentang Penghentian Sementara Ekspor Pasir Laut. Penghentian itu akan ditinjau kembali jika penetapan batas antara Indonesia dan Singapura sudah tuntas (pasal 2 ayat 2). Batas maritim Indonesia-Sigapura memang sudah ditetapkan namun di ujung barat dan timur segmen batas perlu ditetapkan titik temu tiga (three junction point) yang melibatkan Indonesia, Singapura dan Malaysia.

Selain itu, ada Pedra Branca, sebuah pulau milik Singapura yang berpotensi memerlukan batas maritim dengan Indonesia di sisi timur Singapura. Sampai saat ini, batas tersebut belum ditetapkan. Dilihat dari dua hal ini, bisa dikatakan bahwa batas maritim Indonesia dan Singapura belum sepenuhnya tuntas. Maknanya, pembukaan izin ekspor pasir ini tidak memenuhi kaidah hukum karena bertentangan dengan Keputusan Menteri Perindustrian dan Perdagangan nomor 117/MPP/Kep/2/2003.

Sebagai catatan penutup, isu ini sesungguhnya lebih besar dari sekedar ekspor pasir. Ini adalah tentang pengelolaan sedimentasi di laut. Oleh karena itu, memahami isu ini harus didahului dengan mehamai isu besarnya. Meski demikian, kita juga sadar bahwa kemungkinan penyimpangan dan agenda tersembunyi dari sebuah kebijakan memang selalu ada. Oleh karena itu, semua pihak terkait harus memahami lalu mengawal dengan ketat. Mari!

I Made Andi Arsana

Protecting Indonesia with Permeable Borders

I started 2024 with an important assignment as a panellist of the Presidential Candidate Debate. Together with other 10 panellists, I was tasked by the General Election Commission of Indonesia to prepare questions for the presidential candidates during the third debate on 7 January 2024.

I saw, the assignment as a panellist is an accumulation of my two-decade study on geospatial aspects of the law of the sea, particularly maritime boundary issues. In May 2003, I was involved in a project of border demarcation between Indonesia and Timor Leste. The project brought me to Atambua in East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia to conduct Global Positioning System (GPS) campaign. It was an eye-opening experience, where I started to understand the boundary making process and how it really is a multi-disciplinary issue.

My introduction to borders issues in 2003 has motivated me to study the area further through formal educations. I then continued to study master degree at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, and PhD at the University of Wollongong, both in Australia. I decided to focus on maritime, instead of land boundary.

In the last two decades, a lot has happened. A maritime boundary agreement on continental shelf (seabed) with Vietnam was signed in June 2003, followed by another agreement with Singapore in 2009. An agreement on exclusive economic zone boundary with the Philippines was signed in May 2014 followed by another one with Singapore in September 2014. The agreements were certainly an achievement for Indonesia but it is far from complete. Some more boundaries are pending.

Indonesia has ten neighbours to deal with: India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and Timor Leste. No maritime boundary agreements have been made with Palau and Timor Leste but negotiations are in the process. Around twenty agreements have been in place with eight neighbours. This makes Indonesia one of the most productive countries in establishing boundaries with its neighbours. While Indonesia is productive in making agreements, none of the maritime boundaries with its ten neighbours have been fully completed.

Towards the end of Jokowi’s administration, progress in maritime boundary delimitation has been made. An agreement with Vietnam on exclusive economic zone boundary was signed in December 2022. This means the two agreements of maritime boundaries between Indonesia and Vietnam are almost two decades apart. The latest one is an agreement of territorial sea boundary with Malaysia. This one marks an important progress considering that the last agreement with Malaysia was signed in 1970. It took more than half a century for the two neighbours to make a little progress. Nevertheless, it deserves an appreciation.

Despite the fact that progress in maritime boundary delimitation is real, some might opine that Indonesia could have done better since maritime affairs have been the focus of Jokowi’s administration. During his campaign in 2013, Jokowi introduced the Global Maritime Fulcrum vision, focusing on the responsible utilisation of ocean for prosperity and putting Indonesia on the global map when it comes to maritime affairs. With this strong policy, one might view that Indonesia could have made a better progress in protecting itself through the establishment of maritime boundaries. In fact, maritime boundary delimitation is by no means an easy process.

Indonesia has been consistent in utilising negotiation as the main way to establish maritime boundaries with its neighbours. This also indicates good relationship between Indonesia and its ten neighbours so there is no need to involve third parties in the process. This is the reason why Indonesia decided not to choose mediation, nor arbitration or litigation. Indonesia has never gone to any courts to settle maritime boundary issues with its neighbours.

Indonesia has also made progress by establishing a maritime boundary segment on the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) with Vietnam in the South China Sea. In December 2022, a-long-waited agreement was signed by the leaders from the two countries, and is now in the process of ratification. Many have been sceptical about progress we can make in the South China Sea but Indonesia and Vietnam have proven the opposite. Apart from the fact that China might not be happy about the agreement, Indonesia and Vietnam have proven that a good collaboration and willingness to progress together have always been a key to achieve something good, even in a seemingly unresolvable situation.

The 2022 agreement with Vietnam has yet to be available for public. However, it is likely that Indonesia and Vietnam have achieved a good negotiated boundary line that lies between the claims of Indonesia’s and Vietnam’s. It is also likely that the EEZ boundary line is not coincident with the 2003 seabed boundary. Having said that, the line dividing seabed between Indonesia and Vietnam is different from the one dividing water column above the seabed. In a particular area between Indonesia and Vietnam, the seabed might belong to Vietnam but the water column above it falls within Indonesia’ jurisdiction of EEZ. This can be complicated in terms of management.

After two decades of studies on maritime boundary issues, I have come up with a conclusion that maritime boundaries remain relevant and important. Such boundaries will help countries define their right and obligation regarding ocean management, including maritime security. However, boundaries can also exclude one from others. Here is where permeable boundaries are required. We need well established boundaries but we also need boundaries that are promoting, instead of preventing, interaction. Such boundaries will present to us a higher degree of certainty as well as opportunities for interaction and collaboration.

Completing maritime boundary delimitation is certainly an important agenda Indonesia’s future leaders should have. I wish I had an opportunity to directly ask presidential candidates during the debate for they views on maritime boundaries. I should have asked, in an interconnected world, how will they establish permeable borders to protect Indonesia’s ocean and resources therein.

I Made Andi Arsana

New maritime boundaries between Indonesia and Vietnam

December 22, 2022 was an historic day for Indonesia and Vietnam. After 12 years of intensive negotiations, the ASEAN neighbors finally concluded an agreement on their maritime boundaries in the South China Sea.

The agreement of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) deals only with the water columns and not the seabed (continental shelf). For Indonesia, this is the first maritime boundary agreement established by the Jokowi administration and the first after Indonesia’s vision of becoming a global maritime fulcrum was coined. Indeed, this is a special agreement.

Between Vietnam and Indonesia, the 2022 agreement is the second after the first was signed in 2003 and ratified in 2007. It took the two countries almost two decades to come up with another agreement after long, intensive negotiations.

The 2003 agreement delimits the seabed between Indonesia and Vietnam and it took almost 30 years to conclude. The agreement completed the maritime boundary lines established by Indonesia and Malaysia around the same area in 1969.

Technically, the 2003 agreement connected Indonesia-Malaysia boundary lines so altogether they enclosed an area of seabed that fell within Indonesia’s jurisdiction. This way, the division of the seabed among Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam in the South China Sea was made crystal clear. There was no dispute on seabed ownership among the three neighbors. The only issue that remained pending was the division of water columns or exclusive economic zones (EEZ) for which Indonesia and Vietnam started intensive negotiations in 2010. On Dec. 22, 2022, the pending issue was successfully settled. Kudos to Indonesia and Vietnam for settling the dispute through negotiations.

What does the new agreement really mean?

First, Indonesia and Vietnam are in a good relationship, indicated by the fact that they managed to settle their differences through negotiation. Second, the division of rights and responsibilities between Indonesia and Vietnam in the South China Sea, both for the water column and the seabed, has now been made clear. This also means a new and clear era of resource management between the two countries.

Third, the agreement put some doubts regarding the possibility to settle boundaries in the South China Sea to rest. The agreement does not certainly settle every single conflict in the South China Sea, but it undoubtedly has brought new hopes of possibilities for dispute settlement.

For Indonesia, the agreement has also answered some lingering questions regarding the settlement of the continental shelf and EEZ boundaries in the same maritime area. We have yet to see the 2022 agreement, but people will genuinely want to know whether the 2022 line coincides with the one established in 2003.

The new agreement will somehow serve as a reference for similar future cases, so it is important to clarify how the agreement treats the EEZ boundary in relation to the existing continental shelf boundary of 2003.

What is next, after the agreement? First, Indonesia and Vietnam need to return to their respective government and parliament for the adoption and ratification of the agreement. It might not be straightforward and it could take time. However, this step cannot be avoided in order for the agreement to be binding in their respective national laws.

Second, both countries need to agree on a law enforcement mechanism around the newly settled border. In general, each country will have their own mechanisms in enforcing the law in their respective EEZ, but it is always good to have a mutual understanding on how lawbreakers will be treated.

Third, both countries need to take care of the technical/geospatial aspects of the agreement. The use of a chart, geodetic datum, coordinate system and map projection are some of the matters that need to be taken into account for effective implementation of the agreement.

Fourth, education on the new borders for the public in general and especially for the surrounding society is essential. Governments of both countries, in collaboration with educational institutions, need to provide society with education so that the issue can be easily understood. The change from the lack of an agreed border to the existence of a border warrants a change in people’s behaviors. This undoubtedly requires adequate education.

Indonesia and Vietnam are two good friends and neighbors. Both are also the “giants” of the economy in Southeast Asia. The agreement on the maritime boundaries they managed to reach confirms their close relationship and also a strong leadership in the region when it comes to settling boundary disputes.

We really hope that other countries will follow suit.

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 I Made Andi Arsana

Seteru dengan Tiongkok di Laut Natuna

Ada berita, kapal Republik Rakyat Tiongkok (RRT) datang ke Laut Cina Selatan (LCS) di sekitar Natuna dan mancing ikan. Menurut Indonesia, itu adalah zona ekonomi eksklusif (ZEE) Indonesia, maka Kementerian Luar Negeri (Kemenlu) kita melayangkan protes keras. Eh, sehari setelah itu, Kemenlu RRT bikin konperensi pers, menyatakan bahwa RRT punya hak atas pulau-pulau dan laut di sebelah utara Natuna. Urusan jadi geger.